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The notion that the cost of increasing family size depends upon the 
level of expenditures or investment per child (child quality), formalized 
in Becker and Lewis (1973) and Willis (1973), provides a rationale for 
the contemporaneous inter-country negative correlation between the 
schooling attainment of young persons and birth rates as well as the 
trends in these variables over time in developed countries during their 
demographic transition. A sufficient condition for fertility to fall 
and, say, schooling to rise as development proceeds in this framework 
is that the shadow-price constant income effect on quality per child 
1exceed that on numbers of children. Such an explanation, however, would 
appear :..o be of little value for those who hold that population growth it­
self impedes economic development (e.g., Coale and Hoover (1958)). From 
this perspective, the compensated substitution. implications of the theory 
are of concern, whereby price interventions which impinge on family size 
decisions can be used to accelerate per-capita income. 
The chief focus of policies aimed at reducing fertility in the absence 
of income growth appears to be on altering the "own" price of children 
through lowering information costs associated with contraceptive methdos in 
order to take advantage of recent innovations in birth control technolo~y. 
In this paper, we examine both theoretically and empirically the natalist 
impact of two alternative potential policies--reductions in the price of 
schooling and tech~ological innovation in the agricµltural context--based on 
a rural household model in which (school) investments per child influence 
the cost of children as in the Becker-Lewis framework and in which the returns 
to schooling rise in a dynamic environment as a consequence of the allocative 
effect of education (Welch, 1970; Schultz, 1975). I show that, as a conse­
quence of the "quantity-quality" interaction, reductions in the direct costs of 
schooling may raise fertility levels even if child schooling and the quantity 
of children are substitutes as conventionally defined and even if (observed) 
income effects are not positive.2 
2 
However, we also show that if schooling improves allocative skills, the 
interaction makes it likely that an acceleration in the flow of agricultural 
even familyinnovations will tend to depress fertility, if schooling and 
size are complements, with the magnitude of the effect depending on the 
degree of competitiveness in the rural labor market. 
Household data from India which contain cross-sectional variations in 
the price of schooling and in which a proportion of households were 
exposed to a governmental program providing increased access to the continuous 
flow of new, high-yielding grain varieties associated with the '!!reen 
revolution' are used to obtain estimates of the natalist impact of the 
alternative policies. Particular attention is paid in the empirical analysis 
to the use of these data to simulate a 'natural' policy experiment by the 
merging of the household information with district-level data. In particular, 
attempts are made to distinguish the response of households to the impact 
of technological change from cross-sectional differences in behavior 
associated with unobserved geographical characteristics which persist over 
time and which, because of the behavior of policy-makers, may be correlated 
with the presence of a policy intervention (Guttman, 1978). 
The empirical estimates confirm both the quantity-quality interaction 
and allocative efficiency hypotheses,indicating that farm family fertility 
school enrollment increased in areas affected by the disseminationdeclined and 
of novel agricultural inputs compared to other farm households. Moreover, 
fertility in non-farm households was higher in those areas where local 
schools were easily accessible despite evidence consistent with schooling 
and numbers of children being substitutes. 
3 
In section I the basic model is formulated in two variants which 
define the spectrum of developing country rural labor market assumptions 
perfect labor mobility and the absence of a market for labor services. 
Section II contains a description of the data and the empirical framework, 
while section III reports on the results obtained and their implications 
for policy. 
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I. Theoretical Framework 
'.i:'o hring out the essential differencer. liet,·een the effects of educatinn:.l 
subvention and agricultural technical change on_ fert:Uit~· in developinr,­
country agriculture I formulate a simple two-nerio<l nodel of t:ie earn 
household. The household's utilit" function, pivcn hy (1), is t 1,e stantlar<l 
quantity-qualit? formufation C'illis, 1973; :Cecl:er and J,ewis, 1<)7J) in 
diich 
(1) C = U (~, q, S) 
N is numl,ers of children, r. is the fraction of total t:ine (=l unit) spent by each 
child in school durins the first (schooling) neriod an<l c; rei;,resents all 
other coJ11T!lodities. ':'.'he function (1) is characterized 1" the usual neo-
classical properties. r::aci1 child spends a fraction "tl of' nrm-school tine 
in period 1 and a fraction of total t me "t'> in :ieriod 2 in "mm" farr1 ,_ 
production. The reMaininz tine in each period is srient in t:1e lahor market 
where\: is the first period (child) ,,,age and w represents the market "rental"n 
rate of hunan ca:1ital or schoolin~ services (1/1 q). r,7e characterize a 
"market lahor" economv as 1 > a . " 0 and a "sur?lus labor"economy uy·J . 
a 1 , n ~ l. Both cases are considered below.2 
Farm income is produced according to a production function r in which 
all variable inputs except the labor of the children, 1 1 , are supressed and 
farm scale A is assumed fixed. Total householJ income in the first period, 
with Ij representin~ non-earnings income in period j and a unit farn output 
price, is: 
(2) Y = 1 + r (1 ; A) + N (1 - a ) (1 - q) Wn1 1 1 1 
where L = N a (1 - q)
1 1 
5 
Total income in the second period is: 
y represents the farm's proportionate advance in technology from period 1 
to 2 which for simplicity is assumed to augment production in a Hicks-neutral 
way. The degree to which output is enhanced is given by the adoption function 
(4) 
(4) y = y (i, q) 
whose inputs are the exogenous flow of innovations i (technological progress) 
and q, the per-child level of schooling. The dynamic allocative effect of 
schooling is thus represented by the positive cross-partials of they 
function. The adoption function has been expressed without the quantity of 
children as an argument. While it would appear that given the small scale 
of Indian farms, increasing the number of children of given quality would 
have a minimal effect on the rate of adoption, the necessary critical 
assumption, as will be shown below, is that an increase in the expected 
flow of innovations does not augment the productivity of Nin adoption. 
Schooling is also assumed for generality to augment the productivity of a 
given number of children in farm production and to enhance market earnings 
power even in the absence of technological innovation. Neither of these 
latter assumptions are crucial to the implications of the model. 
The two-period income constraint, ignoring discounting, is tl-ius: 
(5) F = Y1 + Y - N q IT - SIT2 q s 
wha-e IT 
s 
is the shadow price of S and IT 
q 
is the non-time price of schooling 
(books, tuition, direct transportation costs). 
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a. Market Labor Hodel 
We first consider the market labor case in which the children participate 
in both farm production and in the labor narket; there are no impediments 
to labor mobility between "own" and other farms or sectors within a P,eographical 
area. In this case ai is less than one and it can be easily shown that 
ar/a1
1 
= 1~ and (1 + y) ar/aL2= w for any (non-zero) values cf N and~-
Maximization of (1) subject to (4) and (5) yields the first-order conditions: 
(6) 
u 





= ;N (TI + w - iµw) - r (12; A) l = ~r (12; A)...s ~ NJ"/~q n 
>.. L 6q j oq 
(8) 
u 
s a:: TI s 
>.. 
where A= Langrangean multiplier. 
The full shadow prices of l~ and q have ttm component s--a 'common' component 
TIQ, which is Multiplied by the level of the other commodity and consists 
of the direct cost of schooling plus time costs less the rental value of 
a unit of schooling services, and a 'unique' component? For the quantity of 
children, this latter is the child wage, which offsets in part the other 
costs of increasing ~Q) -1nd which is independent of the levc2ls of eitiler 
q or N. The unique price component for q represents the innovational 
returns to schooling, which is, of course, dependent on both the quantity 
of children and the level of q. 
From (6) and (7) it can be seen that because the non-ti~e cost of 
schooling II enters the shadot,' prices of both q and N, a change in this 
q 
price will have direct ("own") and indirect ("cross") effects on both 
commodities, while a change in the effectiveness with which q raises farm 
putput through adoption will have only an indirect price effect on the 
7 
quantity of children and a direct price effect on q. More rigorously, by 
differentiating totally (5), (6), (7), and (8) we obtain the total effects 
of changing the direct cost of schooling on q and N, where ♦ is the 
determinant of the bordered Hessian, the$ are the relevant cofactors and 
re 
oq/oF and oN/oF are observed income elasticities: 
(9) ~"' AN .$22 + AQ $21 - Nq Bi 
dil $ ¢ oF 
q 
$ ¢
(10) dN • Aq_l-.!.+ AN ~- Nq oN 
dil ¢ $ oF q 
Second-order conditions constrain the first terms (corresponding to the 
conventional compensated O'Wll price effects) in (9) and (10) to be negative 
(¢ < O, ¢ii> 0). The second terms, the cross price effects, are not 
signed. However, the dependence of the shadow price of U on q and vice versa 
makes the signs of $ and¢ likely to be negative. It can be
12 21 
readily demonstrated that: 
(11) sign [,i1 ] -= sign [¢c - TI 2]
12 12 
A TIQ s 
(12) sign [ $
21 
] -= sign [ $ C 12 - A O¼ -!r_ 1L..a2 q vi) TI' s 2] aq a12 
where ¢c is the cofactor from the bordered Hessian of the standard non­12 
interactive three-commodity consumer model, and whose sign defines in the 
Hicks-Slutsky convention whe1herN and q are complements cmcl2 > O) or 
substitutes. Since the second terms in brackets in (11) and (12) must he 
positive, we see that because of the interaction between q and N the cross 
price effects may be positive even if N and q are weak complements 
and must be positive if N and q are substitutes. Thus, for a schooling 
subsidy, ( a reduction in IT) to be effective in reducing fertility, it 
q 
is neither necessary nor sufficient for N and q to be substitutes. 
8 
It is instead necessary that the 'unique' cross price effect AN¢12 /¢ be 
positive. This latter condition is. not sufficient, however, even if the 
income effect is ignored, because a reduction in schooling costs makes it 
cheaper to "consume" more children of fixed schooling level; thus the effect 
of an educational subsidy on N may·take on any sign, even if the cross price 
. . . . 4 
eff ect is positive. Second-order conditions only ~onstrain the sum of the 
compensated 'common' price elasticities for N and q to be negative. 
The effects of an increase in the flow of technological innovations i 
on q and N,given by (13) and (14), are however, predictable under much 
weaker conditions than thosepertaining to the lowering of school costs. 
¢ 
(13) .9..9. c -A fr_ r (12 ; A) 22 + oy 
di oqoi <t> oi 
¢ 




Given that education's contribution to output rises with the pace of 
technical change as implied by the dynamic allocative hypothesis, the der.1and 
for school in~ unambiguously increases with i if q is non:-inf erior. ~forever, 
if (11) is negative. as is li~Dly if q and N interact, and the ,n~nmo 
1e ers · srna ( non-positive,· 1 emand 1, 
decrease in response to expected rises in the flow of innovations, As 
was shown above, the fulfillment of these latter conditions was not sufficient 
for a reduction in TI to lower fanily size, Expressions (13) and (14) also 
ff ect on nurnb is 11 or · ) S t e d f or will 
q 
suggest that the magnitudes of the effects of technical change on q or '.l 
are positively associated with scale. 
The effects of a rise in the price of child time on q and N also are 
relatively unambiguous compared to those due to changing IT, as W is a q n 
unique component of the full shadow price of children. i·.'ith H and q weak 
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complements or substitutes, a rise in W raises fertility and lowers school­n 
ing, if oN/oF is small, as indicated by (15) and (16): 
(15) ~ • AN <1>22 -A (1 - q) 'P12 + [1 - N (1 - q)] oN 
dW q, T 1 dFn 
(16) dN -= -1(1 - q) !u_+ ).N <P12 + [L1 - N (1 - q)] oN dW 
n <P <P dF 
The market labor model thus indicates that as a consequence of the 
dependency of the price of Non q, the direction of the effect of an 
introduction of a school subsidy on fertility cannot be predicted while 
augmenting the flow of agricultural technological innovations is likely 
to both increase schooling and lower family size, the effects being 
proportional to farm size. The model also indicates that birth rates 
will be higher and school enrollment likely lower where child wages are 
high. 
b. Surplus Labor Hodel 
In a setting in which most farm family members are not participants in 
. 6the wage labor market as eiti1er buyers or sellers of labor services, as 
depicted in the "peasant" models of Sen (1966) and ~!azumdar (1975), or 
where labor marginal product is not closely related to observed wages 
(Ranis and Fei (1961), the marginal product of labor services in farm 
production is affected directly by the levels of N and q chosen. First 
order conditions for N and q, given by (6a) and (7a), have however, the 
(6a) 
(7a) 
same structure, ,with common and unique price components, as in'the market 
model. Accordingly,the effects of a changein IT on N and q are equally
q 
ambiguous, with the relevant expressions the same as (9) and (10) except 
for mutatis mutandis changesin the bordered Hessian and cofactors. Denoting 
¢1these by and ¢1rc' the relationship between the sign of the cross price 
effects in the surplus labor model and the usual complementary-substitutability 
expression is given by: 
(lla) sign [¢112 • ¢~1 ] .,. sign [¢>c 12 - A (IT 1 
Q 




2 Nq - _h ~ tjl q) IT ] 
soq yL2 
Again, the unique cross price effect is likely to be positive because of 
the interaction between q and family size even if N and q are complements 
in the Hicks-Slutsky sense. 
The direction of the relationship between the rate of technical 
change and q and N, given by (13a) and (14a) depends, howeve~ on the 
magnitude of the marginal product of labor, in contrast to the market case. 
qil 22 q> l 21(13a) dq = -A ra 2y r (L,,; A) Nwl - A cy er qljl + 
~ 
- !x. §I_ 
"' 
. I ,~ .S::-f .S::T ,d -· .S::-f --.S::T ,ddi L"''t""- V- VA.,12 J 'f' v.- v~z 'I' 
oy r ( ) ~ 
oi oF 
-: 
(14a) dN = ->. !x.~ qi/I t\1 -A [~ r (L ; A) + _h .§I_ Nlji ¢ l 12 + 
¢> Idi 6i oL ""7 oqoi 2 6i oLi J2 
!x. r ( ) oN 
oi 6F 
Here, because of the constraints (assumed) on off-farm labor supply, the 
increase in i directly effects the returns to (child) labor in the second 
period. The fertility effect (14a) thus contains a positive first 
11 
term as well as a negative cross effect, leading to an ambiguous result. 
If the marginal product of labor is quite low, a likely situation where 
the wage labor market is inoperative, however, the negative terms in (13a) 
and (14a) become insignificant. The same results as in the market model 
are then obtained--i and N are negatively andiand q positively related. 
It should be noted that the predicted effects of technical innovation 
on fertility in each of the two models were derived under ceteris paribus 
assumptions, holding, in particular, wage rates constant in the market 
model. The total effects of sustained technical progress may thus be 
quite different from those derived if the labor market model is relevant, 
as such change may alter the demand for and supply of labor and thus 
alter wage rates. To the extent that wages do enter into the shadow 
prices of N and q, as does W in the first model and, the wife'i wage isn 
also a component of ITQ, (Willis, 1973; Ben-Porath, 1973), the signs of 
the total effects of a change in i cannot be predicted. Horeover, families 
not directly benefitting from the technical progress, such as households 
without land, may as well alter their fertility decisions in response to 
the wage rate (demand) consequences of technical progress. In the 
empirical section, attention is thus paid to the distinction between the 
direct ceteris paribus technical change effects on N and q and those 
channelled through wages. the extentTo that those former affects 
should be most relevant to farm (landed) households if schooling 
augments allocation skills, an additional prediction of the analysis is 
that, controlling for wage effects, there should be little or no impact of 
agricultural technical progress on the fertility or schooling behavior 
of non-farmers. 
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II. Empirical Analysis 
a. Natural and guasi-natural Experiments 
The preceding tleoretical framework suggests that although the impact 
of agricultural development through refueling technological innovation 
is more likely to have an anti-natalist impact than will school improvement 
as a consequence of the q-N interaction, empirical analysis is ultimately 
required. The quantitative magnitudes and direction of the effects of these 
potential policy tools on birth rates were shown to depend on the unknown 
preference structures of the households in the case of the cost of schooling 
and on the competitiveness of the rural labor market with respect to innovation, 
chara0teristics which cannot be determined a priori. To estimate the effects 
of sustained agricultural technical change and a school subsidy on fertility 
(and schooling) it is necessary, however, to obtain data based on an 
"experiment" in which randomly selected households are impacted by one of 
the two variables. Comparisons can then be made of the subsequent fertility 
behavior of the "impacted" and 'control' households. Such experi-
ments may have occured unintentionally as a result cf. political or other 
developments over time or across geographical units, such as the introduction 
and then removal of a law, in which case the events provide a. "natural" 
experiment if documented by data. 
A data set based on a national sample survey of 5115 rural houselwlds 
collected in India in three rounds between 1968 and 1971 by the National 
Council of Applied Economic Research awears to contain close approximations 
to such experiments. Between 1961 and 1964, the federal government of 
India instituted a program, the Intensive Agricultural District Program 
(IADP), in which one district from each Indian state was selected to 
receive on a continuing basis technical assistance and assured supplies 
of fertilizer. By 1971 households in these districts, identified in the 
13 
survey data, were subject to a significantly greater flow of new techniques, 
chiefly those associated with the "green revolution" high yielding grain 
varieties, over a 7 to 10 year span compared to prior periods. Moreover, 
the program was expected to continue at its outset and was funded throughout 
7
the period. A second relevant "experiment" contained in these data is the 
existence of villages with no primary schools,(5 percent), with households residing 
in such villages facing therefore significantly greater schooling costs. 
The principal discrepency between the ideal or natural experimental 
data and the "quasi-natural" experiments contained in the Indian survey 
is that the districts selected for the IADP and the non-school villages 
were not necessarily chosen randomly. lf the IADP districts were selected 
because of pre-program characteristics correlated with fertility or 
schooling, for example, a variable representing the presence of a household 
in an IADP district will reflect district-level differences in serially 
correlated unmeasured variables as well as the impact of the flow of new 
technologies. 
To obtain a more precise measure of exogenous agricultural developMent, 
regression methods can be used to purge the IADP variable of some of the 
pre-program systematic components. A dummy variable taking on the value of 
one if· a district was chosen for IADP was regressed against a set of district 
characteristics, including schooling levels, pertaining to sixty-eight 
of the eighty-eight districts represented in the sample survey based on 
pre-IADP 1961 census daaa. Use of the residuals from this regression, 
reported below, which are orthogonal to the variables chacterizing the 
level of development prior to the introduction of the program, should provide 
a less biased estimate of the impact of agricultural develo~ent in a 
14 
regression explaining fertility in 1971 than the district-level IADP 
variable.S 
The OLS estimates are: 
(17) IADP = 1.195 + .0032 ENR11 - .0103 ENRF + .0027 LITI1 + .0153 LITF 
(.0054) (.0089) (.0079) (.0137) 
-. 0108 LAND + •0010 DI ST + •0023 NLAlID + .. 0024 IRR 
(.0054) (.0038) (.0042) (.0024) 
-2-.0021 PROD+ .906 FACT+ .060 SCALE R = .264 
(.0014) (.307) (.013) n = 68 
where LA!ID = average landholdings (acres), DIST = the Kuznets ratio of 
landholding inequality, NLAND • proportion of households without land, 
IRR= percentage of land irrigated, PROD= rupee value of production per 
acre, FACT= number of factories per household, SCALE= proportion of 
factories employing 10 or more workers, LITH (F) = male (female) literacy 
rate, rural populati0n aged 15-44, E~lRM (r) = male (fer.iale) school 
enrollment rate (5-14). The results in (17) suggest that selection was 
not random with respect to levels of industrialization or c,;cl1oolins. Jistricts 
with large factories and characterized by greater landholding inequality, 
but not higher levels of agricultural productivity, by marginally higher 
levels of irrigation and literacy rates, and by lower average holdings of 
land in 1961 were evidently selected for the program. 9 
The distribution of schools across rural villages may also be non­
random, with schools likely not constructed where the village-levelde~and for 
education is mininal. The presence of a school may thus reflect other
'· 
village attributes influencing schooling demand, resulting ina possibly 
spurious relationship between this proxy for IT and the housclwld's fertilityq 
15 
and educational investment. As a first-order test of this hypothesis, a 
dummy variable representing the presence of a school was regressed against 
the complete set of village-level variables in the NCAER data, including 
the presence of a health center, a factory, small scale industry, and 
bank or credit union; electrification; village size, and distance to 
nearest urban center. The only variable with a statistically significant 
coefficient was that for the presence of a factory. Exclusion of the set 
of variables other than the latter resulted in no significant change in 
"explanatory" power. These results thus suggest that the factory variable 
should be included in regression equations determining fertility and 
schooling (at the household level) along with the school variable if the 
presence of a factory in the village affects either of the behavioral 
variables. 
An additional undesirable characteristic of the quasi-natural experinents 
portrayed in the Iudian data, based on geographical differences in the 
policy variables, is that while an individual household cannot have influenced 
IADP implementation and school presence, a correlation of "tastes" for children 
and schooling with these geographical variables may be ~resent in the data as 
a result of selective m.igra.L.iuu. Appc:1.1:1::ul. .imp1::.1.ft::L:L.iuu::; .iu the land markE:-t which 
make the purchase and sale of land very difficult (Bardhan, 1977) greatly 
reduce, however, the mobility of farm households, those hypothesized 
to be most affected by IADP. Moreover, while such considerations are less 
applicable to landless, wage worl:ers, interdistrict mobility appears to 
be quite low in India (Rosenzweig, 1978). We mi~ht thus expect that the 
relationships between the village-level school variable and the fertility 
of non-farm households would contain the only serious b:la s, al though it 
1 
16 
would appear that such bias should not obfuscate the sign of the "true" 
relationships. We present some evidence on intervillage as well as inter­
district mobility below. 
b. Measurement and Specification 
To obtain estimates of fertility and schooling responses to the changes 
in the pace of technological innovation associated with IADP, flow rather 
than stock measures of the behavioral variables are appropriate. Because IADP 
began in 1964 in about 1/2 the IADP districts,use of children ever born 
as a measure of fertility, as in most studies based on micro data (Willis, 
1973; Ben-Porath, 1973; Schultz, 1976), for example, would obscure the 
impact of the program, as given the relatively low singulate nean age at 
marriage in India (17), the cumulative fertility of women aged 24 and over 
in the 1971 round of the survey would mostly reflect pre-IADP marital 
fertility behavior (to an extent positively correlated with age). The 
pregnancy rosters provided in the data allow instead both the examination 
of measures of additions to the stock of children after the program was in 
place as well as the cumulative fertility of the household prior to IADP. 
The birth rate variable used in the analysis is based on the total 
number of births of women aged 25 to 40 in 1971 born from 1968 to 1971 
which is age-standardized as given by (18) in order to take into account 
age patterns of fecundity. 
a-.5 
L r (x\ 




Then (x) are the "natural" birth rates of women aged x taken from the 
fertility schedule constructed from ten non-contracepting populations by 
17 
Coale and Trussell (1974), The f (x)k are the actual births of married 
woman k aged x in each year. The birth ratio measure (BRAT) thus reflects 
the degreee to which a woman reduced or "controlled" her fertility relative 
to a biological benchmark at any age in the 2.5 year period prior to the 
10
1971 survey, For women aged 25-40 in the sample, BRAT ranges from Oto 
11
1.82, with approximately 60 percent of the observations at zero. Becaase 
of both the natural zero bound of the birth ratio and the concentration of 
observations at that bound, use of BRAT as a dependent variable in a 
regression framework would appear to call for the use of Tobit as an 
estimation procedure (Tobin, 1953). 
Because fertility control within marriage may also vary with age, 
significant differences in BRAT in 1971 associated with IADP could merely 
reflect differences in age patterns of control characteristic of house­
holds in districts chosen for IADP rather than changes in desired family 
size. To test if the control of marital fertility differed 
between IADP and non-IADP districts prior to the introduction of the 
new technologies, we use the pregnancy roster to construct a duration 
ratio (DRAT) measure of cumulative fertility for the women in 1964, given 
by (19), 
a-7.5 
r f (x)k 
(19)DRAT x=m a = 25 • • • 40 
k.a-7.5 7a-
r n (x) 
X =m 
where mis age at marriage. This fertility measure is thus standardized 
both for the duration of marriage and age of of the woman and reflects the 
average level of fertility control practised from marriage to the cutoff 
date marking the start of IADP, The properties of. this fertility variable 
are described in Boulier and Rosenzweig (1978). As can be seen from (18) 
and (19), DRAT is simply BRAT cumulated back tom from 1964. 
18 
Total cumulative fertility may also differ between women o.f a given· 
age because of differences in the age at marriage as well as due to differences 
in marital fertility control. ARAT, given by (20), is an age-standardized 
CEBa-7.5 
3.~7(20) 
I: n (x) 
x=-12 
measure of total fertility f.or the women in 1964, differing from DRAT only 
because of variations in marital duration. 
Just as cumulative fertility embodies the history of birth control 
behavior prior to IADP, measures of the schooling attainment (highest 
grade completed) of children will reflect in part pre-IADP school enrollment, 
particularly for children aged above 10. An age-standardization procedure 
was,therefore,employed,comparable to that used to construct the birth rate 
measures• In this case, the number of children aged 5-14 currently (in 1971) 
in school in each household was divided by the predicted number in school 
based on the sample average single-year enrollment rates and the 5-14 age 
distribution of the household. The enrollment measure is thus: 
"k 
I e (x)ik 
(21) i=l X = 5 • • • 14 
where P (x) is the sample proportion of children aged x in school, c (x) 1k 
is variable which takes on the value of one if the ith child aged x in 
household k is in school and nk is the number of children 5-14 in the 
12household.. 
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The sub-sample of households chosen for estimation purposes consists of 
those with spouse-present married women, aged 25-40 "11th at least one 
surviving child aged 5 to 14, residing in the 68 districts which could he 
matched with aggregate district data. The reduced-form equations for each 




t = aOij + ali EDU + a.Zij EDH + a 3 .. L~ + ¥j 1<:w + a5 .. LWC +DRAT t-7 
l.J l.J 
ARAT a6ij \·.11,Tl!Y + a 7if LAND + a3ijt-7 FACT + a9ij SCHL + alOij 1rns + 
i = EIW , BRAT DRAT
-
t t, t-7
j = farm, non-farm
f = farm only
where RES = IADP - IADP from (17) 
These are estimated separately for households cultivating farm land (farmers) and 
non-cultivating w~ge or salary worker households (non-farmers). All the 
variables employed are defined in Table 1, which also provides sample means 
13
and st~ndard deviations. 
Because only 50 percent of the males and 25 percent of the females in 
the farm households participated in the wage labor market as sellers of 
labor services, wages were estimated using an instrumental variables 
procedure in which the natural logarithim of the daily wage rates earned 
by male and feraale adult market participants were regressed against a set 
of personal, village-level and district characteristics. The specifications 
employed are given by (23) 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions, Means and Standard Deviations 
Farm and Non-Farm Households, Women Aged 25-40 
Farm Non-Farm 
Variable Definition Mean S,D, Mean s,d. 
ENR Age-standarized enrollment index
8 ].02 1.04 1.01 1.03 
BRAT 11 11 
8
marital birth rate .411 .536 .400 .526 
DRAT " 11 cumulative marital fertility (1964)
8 
'b .739 .596 .797 .702 
AP.AT 11 11 11 total 11 (1964)
8 'b .454 .310 .450 .293 
EDH Schooling attainment, husband 2.74 1.50 2.69 1.54 
EDW Schooling 11 , wife 1.43 .984 1.66 1.22 
LWH Natural logarithim of husband's wage (rupees) 1.115 .620 1.282 .503 
LWW II II 11 wife's wage .543 .504 .4 77 .447 
LWC II II " child wagec .255 .389 · .301 .289 
WLTHY Non-earnings income 91.8 369.5 34.3 169.4 
LAND Gross cropped area 14.2 14.7 0 0 
SCHL Presence of school in village(•!) .947 .224 .951 .215 
FACT 11 11 factory 11 11 (•l) · .040 .195 .146 .353 
SSI " " small-scale industry in village (al) .447 1.70 .568 1.53 
WTHR Effect of weather on crops (•l if no adverse effect) .s·oo .4oo .1 94 .381 
SIZE Population size of village 1923 2541 4312 5702 
IADP Presence of !ADP in district (•1) .207 .406 .220 .415 
Residual from IADP .029 .327 .027 .306 
AGEW Age of wife 32.2 5.00 32.6 4.78 
AGER Age of husband 34 .3 6.17 35.4 5.42 
n 1186 350 
a
See text. 
b From sample restricted to women married prior to 1963. See text. 




h = um, U!W 
Inclusion of the RES or IADP variable in (23) provides estimates of the 
wage impact of the introduction of the new technologies while the village­
level employment opportunity variable coefficients--SSI, FACT, SIZE--will 
in part reflect impediments to intervillage labor mobility. The sex­
specific district wage variable will attain significance if inter-district 
mobility is low, as this variable will pick up district-level differences 
in employment opportunities not reflected in human capital attributes. 
A regression similar to those specified in (23), but excluding the 
schooling achievement variable, was also run with the daily wages of 
children 5-14 as the dependent variable. Because the only variable which 
contributed significantly to the explanatory power of this equation was 
the district-level agricultural child wage, the log of this latter 
variable was used directly in equations (22). 
The theoretical framework suggests that if the imputed wage rates 
accurately reflect marginal values of time in farm production, as would be 
true if tnost farm households either sell or buy labor services in the 
market and(local competition prevails) LWCwill be positively associated 
with birth rates and, if income effects are small, negatively correlated 
with ENR, from (15) and (16). Since the adult male wage reflects the 
expected returns to the services of children (as well as the income 
potential of the father) and thus enters the common shadow price of N and 
q, LWH must be positively associated with either or both of the schooling 
and fertility variables. 
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The household production of child "quality", which should be positively 
correlated with schooling if pre-school investments contribute to learning 
efficiency, as depicted in most human capital accumulation models (Ben-Porath, 
1968; Heckman, 1976), has been hypothesized to require significant quantities 
of the mother's time (Mincer, 1962; Willis, 1973). This hypothesis would 
suggest that in the labor market model of agriculture, increases in the 
value of the wife's wage in addition to increasing the returns to fer.iale 
children may raise the common component of the shadow prices of ;~ and Cl 
(TIQ). UJW thus may be negatively associated with either BF.AT or EN:!\ or 
both. Indeed, if the wage cost effect is dominant, the wife's wage and the 
price of schooling Sela.should have si~ilar (in sign) effects on q and~ 
except that a rise in TI (SCHL = O) diminishes family resources. 
q 
The wage and school price variables should play the same roles in 
farm as in non-farm household behavior under competitive conditions in the 
labor market. The model indicates, however, that RES will be positively 
correlated with ENR (the own price effect) and significantly associated with 
BRAT only for farm households, if schooling contributes to dynamic allocative 
efficiency. RES should have little or no direct effect on non-farm 
household decisions. Moreover, if the model is correct, the sign of 
the RES coefficient in the farm household BRAT equation will indicate 
the direction of the cross price effect between q and N. The interaction 
term (RES•FARM) is also included in (22) for the farm household specification 
to test if larger farms benefit most from the returns to sclwoling 
investment in a dynamic context, as suggested by the model. 
Of the other variables in (22), FACT is included to control for 
local industrialization, which could, independently of agricultural 
14
technical change, increase the returns to schoolinr,. WLTHY reflects 
non-earnings income and its coefficients will thus measure pure income 
effects on the schooling and fertility variables. The direct effect of 
23 
landholding size (LAND) on both ENR and BRAT cannot be predicted, however, 
in the context in which opportunities for wage earnings do not exis~as the 
size of landholdings is positively correlated with the value of the time 
of children and thus with the price of schooling as well as with full income. 
Where wage rates accurately reflect the value of time,however, farm size 
does not affect shadow prices. Finally, the parental schooling variables 
are portmanteau variables, included to capture levels of household 
production efficiency, tastes (modern attidudes?) and awareness of 
contraception (Michael and Willis, 1975) among other attributes. 
15 
c. Results 
Table 2 reports the estimated sex-specificadult (15-65) wage coefficients 
in which both RES and the IADP dummy variable are included, with and without 
the district-level wage rate. The education coefficients indicate that rates 
of return to schooling are on the order of 15 percent but that life-cycle 
wage profiles are essentially flat. The significance of the small scale 
industry and village size variable coefficients suggests, however, that 
inter-village labor mobility is not perfect, as mobility would erase such 
differences unless these variables reflect compensatory ----~- ~----..._ __ ..._, __p.1.. CWj,_d,. I u---..... ,vJ.. t: .1.lllIJULLi:illL.J.Y, 
wage rates appear to be from 106:nales) to 22 (females) percent higher in 
districts exposed to the new greeen revolution technologies based on the 
residual measure of IADP. The characteristics of IADP districts included 
in the IADP equation (17), such as mean land size 
\ 
and distritution, do not, 
however, a?pear to account for any of the variation in male ot female wage 
~ates, as none of the IADP coefficients attain statistical significance. 
The second-stage enrollment estimates are presented in Table 3 for 
farm and non-farm households. As is consistent with the labor market model, 
the child wage has a negative effect while the adult male wage is positively 
24 
Table 2. OLS Regression Coefficients: Ln Wage Equations, All Households, 
Males and Females, 1974. 
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S~E.E. ,498 ,458 .516 .461 .397 .JSJ .J84 ,374 
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Table 3. OLS-IV Regression Coefficients: Age-Standardized School Enrollment 
Rates (ENR), ehildren 5-14, Parm and Non-Farm Households, 1971. 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
Farm Non-Farm
Independent 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) 
EDH .211 .222 .210 .222 .217 .226 
(.026) (.026) (.026) (.026) (. 038) (. 038) 
EDW .049 .056 .048 .056 .108 .117 
(.035) (.036) (.035) (.036) (.055) (.055) 
a 
LWH .347 .352 .353 .352 .439 .446 
(.094) (. 095) ( .095) ( .095) (.140) (.141) 
a 
LWW -.057 -.067 -.062 -.065 -.044 -.043 
(.121) (.121) (.121) ( .122) (.187) (.188) 
LWC -.160 -.222 -.152 -.228 -.018 -.034 
(.094) (.095) (.095) (.096) (. 018) (. 020) 
WLTHY (xl0-3) .131 .118 .133 .117 .112 .088 
(.060) (. 061) (. 063) (. 062) (.170) ( .180) 
LAND (xlO-l) .035 .031 .023 .034 
(.024) (.024) (.028) (. 025) 
FACT .473 .• 490 .471 .493 .148 .175 
(.118) (.119) (.118) (.119) ( .140) (.145) 
___ _,, J
C: t"UT .185 .221 1 AO .220 .008 .033--·...... 
(.124) (.125) ( .124) ( .125) (.193) ( .194) 
~p .296 .254. .260 
(.075) (.093) (.177) 
RES .173 .202 .110 
(.084) (.118) ( .153) 




Constant -.440 -.417 -.434 -.417 -.594 -.587 
-2
R .290 .281 .290 .281 .383 .377 
S,E,E, .880 .885 .880 ,886 ,885 .889 
•Instrumental variable. 
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associated with enrollment in both sub-samples. The nale Hage effects 
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all specifications 
while the child wage coefficients are statistically significant (.05 level) 
in the specifications with the RES variable. Consistent with the price of 
time argument, the femalewage displays a negative coefficient, again in 
both types of households. 
Income effects appear to be strong--the t~THY coefficients, positive 
and statistically significant in the farm suu-sample, indicate an incone 
elasticity of enrollment of about .5 while the ;~THY coefficients in the 
non-farm sub-sample, not neasured with much precision, indicate an 
income elasticity of about .1. 
School enrollment in farm households appears to be fro~ 19 to 22 
percent lm,:er where villages do not have a school. As expected, farm 
household school enrollment is also significantly higher in the districts 
chosen for !ADP. Ilm-1ever, when the RES measure is used in place of t:-ie 
IADP dummy th is differential drops from 30 to 17 percent. The latter 
results are thus consistent with hypothesis that parents on -farms perceive 
the rise in returns to schooling investment when exposed to increased 
flows of new techniques, although the relationship is du.e in part to a 
positive incoue effect. Moreover, while the !ADP coefficient is of sir.ilar 
magnitude in ti1e non-farr.i suh-sample compared to that in the f arrr. sanple, 
when the pre-IADP district ci1aracteristics are purged from the IADP 
variable in specification (17) the coefficient drops substantially helo,· 
t1at int• he f arm houseno ' ld . 16 A poo l ed regression ( cation. ('J))~equation. . spec ifi 
27 
with slope dummies representing farm status, indicates that the differen~e 
in the !~ES coefficients across household type is statistically sipnificant 
at the .05 level. The interaction coefficients in specfications (3) 
and (4), howeve~, ~hile of tl1e correct sign, do not sunport the hypothesis 
that the returns to sc:10oling are higher on laq•er farms. 
Of the other variables, farm size does not arrear to have an iLlµortant 
influence on school enrollment, indicating that marginal values of time 
may be substantially captured by the imputed v,age variables. '.!oreover, 
school enrollment appears to be significantly higher in villages that 
are at least partly industrialized, as represented by the presence of a 
factory, with the effect significantly stronRer in farm householdi. 
The Tobit BRAT coefficients, estirnated usinp, naxir.mM-likelihood, are 
reported in Table 4. These also appear to be consistent with the hypothesis 
that farm households respond much more stronr,ly to agricultural technical 
change in terms of their fertility behavior than do non-farn households. 
Birth rates in fdrn households are about eleven percent lower, 
controlling for the wage effects of technical change, in districts v,here 
the flo~rs of ne,,; technologies ~.:ere raore rapid, while no significant 
differences in birth rates are exhibited by the non-farm households in the 
!ADP districts. This result appears robust to the measure!'lent of IADP 
variable. The cross-price effect in (14) thus appears tobe positive in 
farm households and to dominate the income effect. v:hich appears fror.i the 
17WLTHY coefficients to be very small. Moreover, the pre-IADP fertility 
estirnates,reported in Table 5, indicate that prior to the introduction of the new 
1-
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Table 4. Maximum-Likelihood Tobit Coefficients: Age-Standardized Marital 
Birth Rates (BRAT), 1968-1971 Farm and Non-Farm Households. 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
~ Non-FamIndependent 




















































































































































R .056 .054 .055 .053 .046 .047 
S.E.E. .522 .522 .522 .522 .512 .512 
4 Instrumantal variable. 
bFrom OLS regression. 
29 
Table 5. .OLS-IV Regression Coefficients: Age-Standardized Cumulative Marital (DRAT) 
and Total (ARAT) Fertility Prior to IADP, Farm and Non-Farm Households, 1964. 
(•tandard errors in parentheses) 
Farm Non-Farm
Independent DRAT ARAT DRAT ARAT
Variable ( 1) ( 2) ( 1) (2) (1) ( 2) (1) ( 2) 
EDH .010 .010 .024 .024 -.127 -.125 .029 .J30
( .037) (.037) ( .019) (.019) (. b67) ( . 068) ( .029) (. 'J29) 
EDW .036 .036 -.023 -.023 .053 .050 -.009 -.008
(.037) ( .037) ( .019) ( .019) ( . 058) ( . 059) ( . 025) (.025)
a
LWH .162 .157 .018 .019 1.237 1.181 .226 .204
( .259) ( .259) ( .137) ( .137) ( .426) (.427) ( .181) (.181) 
LWW'a -.039 -.041 .082 .082 -.701 -.672 -.121 -.116
( .228( ( . 223) ( .117) ( .118) ( .324) ( . 325) ( .138) ( .138) 
LWC .046 .037 .068 .070 .100 .148 .047 .076
( .071) ( .071) (.038) ( . 038) ( .141) ( .138) ( .060) ( .059) 
WL'l'H:l'. (xlO-3) .056 .057 .019 .019 .191 .223 -.018 -.8002
( .061) ( .061) ( • 030) ( . 031) ( . 240) ( . 241) ( .100) ( .100) 
LAND .100 .101 .180 .180
( .141) ( .141) ( . 075) ( • 075) 
AGEW -.024 -.024 -.003 .... 003 -.033 -.034 -.003 -.003
( .004) ( .004) ( .002) ( .002) ( .009) ( .008) ( .004) ( . 004) 
t"",-,TTT.:,1.,ru, .015 .013 -.026 -.025 .158 .182 .OJl .029
( .096) ( .096) ( .051) (. 051) ( .186) ( .187) ( .079) ( . 080) 
FACT .170 .171 .028 .028 ,309 .286 .024 .029
( ,113) ( .llJ) ( • 059) ( .060) ( .114) (.117) ( .049) ( . 050). 
IADP -.014 .002 -.178 -.104
( .056) (.030) (.109) (.049) 
RES .005 -.002 -.030 -.104
( .068) ( .036) ( .136) ( . 058) 
Constant 1.228 1.224 .456 ,457 2.088 2.074 .450 .414 
R:-2 
.049 .049 .019 .019 .097 .oa9 .. 062 .056 
S.E.E. .581 .581 .306 .306 .677 .670 .283 .284 
ainstrumental variable. 
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technologies, no significant differene€ in either marital fertility control 
(DRAT) or total cumulative fertility (ARAT) existed between farm house­
holds, although total fertility may have been slightly lower ar.iong non-farm 
households in the districts that were ultimately chosen for the program. 
In contrast to the IADP and RES estimates, n:one of the coefficients of 
the school presence variables achieve statistical significance l1y conventional 
standards in the BRAT equations and, as is consistent •-'ith the interactive 
quantity-quality model, where schools are present (IT is low), fertilityq 
rates of the non-farm households are higher. This latter result indicates 
the dominance of the negative own price over the positive pricecross 
effect (given the low income elasticity of children). ~toreover, the 
presence of factories, which appeared to increase enrollnent rates, also 
is positively associated with birth rates in farm and non-farm households; 
industrialization without sustained technical chanre thus does appearnot 
to necessarily lower fertility. 
As in the enrollment equations, the child wage coefficients display 
signs in accord with the predictions of the model, being positively 
associated with birth rates in the two sub-samples. The negative 
coefficients on the wife's wag~ appear to additionally support the price 
of time hypothesis and parallel the results obtained by Rosenzweir. and 
Evenson (1977) based on district-level data from India for 1q61. As 
was noted, because the adult male and female wage rates enter the common 
shadow price of q and N, the former reducing and the latter on net augmentinr 
ITQ, the adult wage coefficients should echo the SCJIL effects in sign patterns. 
Since the positive LWH and negative LWW coefficients in all equations indicate 
the pervasive domination of own over cross urice effects, the nefative 
sign of the school presence variable coefficient in the farm household sub­
sample fertility equation represents the only result inconsistent with 
31 
the structure of the model. Thus in the 5x4 matrix of adult wage, SCHL and RES 
coefficient signs for the two dependent variables in the two sub-samples, 
only one sign is "wrong" (al~hough not statistically significant). 
The estimates reported in Tables 3 a11d 4 thus indicate that 1.) the 
cross price effect between the quantity of children and child quality 
(as represented by school enrollment) is positive, as indicated by the 
RES coefficients in the farm household BRAT equation and 2) that when the 
effects of a variable changeon ENR and BRAT are composed of own and cross 
price effects, the former tend to dominate, so that reductions in the 
price of schooling appear to have a small but positive effect on non-farm 
birth rates. 
Computation of the total \.rage and direc~ affects of the IADP-related 
disequilibria, from the RES coefficients in Tables 2 and 4, indicate that 
where IADP was introduced birth rates fell by 12 percent in farm households 
and by 5 percent in.non-farm families, the latter due almost totally to 
the increase in the female wage. By summing over age-specific birth 
rates in the two sub-samples from the mean ages at marriage to age 45, 
these reductions would translate into a decrease in completed family 
size of .72 and .32 children respectively. Aside from the qualifications 
already discussed, these last estimates must be interpreted with caution, 
however, as they are conditional on a constant marriage age, which 
itself may change in response to agricultural development. 
32 · 
III. Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to integrate in a single model the 
theoretical literature on the interaction between the quantity of and 
investment in children with that on the allocative roles of schooling in 
a dynamic context to shed light on the effects of educational subvention 
and agricultural innovation on fertility change in a developing country 
context. Household data from India which contain a geographically selective 
agricultural development program promoting technical change to farmers and 
village-level differences in school accessability were used to estimate 
the effects of changes in the shadow prices of children and schooling 
investments per child on fertility and school enrollment. The empirical 
estimates were consistent with the model, suggesting that farm households 
responded to their exposure to new agricultural inputs by both increasin~ 
schooling investment and by lowering family size even though the ne~ 
technology appeared to increase the demand for labor services. However, 
school proximity, while increasing schooling, appeared to be either 
negligibly or positively correlated with birth rates. These results 
thus indicate that the returns to investments in agricultural research 
and dissemination in terms of their efficacy in promoting economic 
development may he even higher in a country such as India than those 
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Footnotes 
1 In Becker and Tomes (1976) it is shown that if the contribution of 
child endowments to total child quality is taken into account, the "true" 
income elasticities of numbers of children and child quality may be equal 
and of average magnitude but economic development may depress fertility 
and raise investments in children. However, it is also pointed out that 
an increase in the rate of exogenous income growth, by augmenting endowments 
relative to potential income, will tend to raise family size and lower 
expenditures on children. In this paper we argue that accelerations 
in economic growth brought about by technical change also invoke price 
effects which are likely to cause fertility to fall as a consequence of the 
interaction between the quantity and quality of children. 
2
neTray (1976) cun8l<lers school subsidization as a possible policy 
tool aimed at reducing fertility. However, he ignores the interaction 
between quality and quantity in incorrectly arguing that a negative coefficient 
in a family size regression on a variable representing child quality, even 
if consistently estimated, is evidence that reductions in the price of 
schooling would lower fertility, as we demonstrate below. 
3The unique prices correspond to the 'fixed' prices introduced in Becker 
and Lewis (1973). In this model, the latter are not necessarily exogenous. 
4Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1978) demonstrate that the sign of the effect 
of an exogenous change in family size on schooling (child quality) provides 
the sign of the unique cross price effect between q and N. Similarly, the 
direction of the effect of an exogenous rise in schooling on N, induced by 
36 
a compulsory schooling law, for example, which would provide the sign of 
~
12 
, would not necessarily indicate whether lowering the direct costs of 
schooling or increasing school accessability would depress fertility (as 
implied in DeTray, 1976), as indicated by expression (10). 
5While child endowments are not explicitly considered in the model to 
reduce complexity, in the context of a developing country we would expect 
that the ratio of total to endowed child quality would be quite low. Becker 
and Tomes (1976) show that this implies that the observed income elasticity 
for numbers of children is likely to be substantially lower than that 
for child schooling. This implication is confirmed below. 
6rt is shown in Rosenzweig (1977) that if family and hired workers are 
close substitutes, as long as households either buy or sell labor'> market 
wages will accurately depict the marginal products and value of time of 
working family members who do not participate in the market as sellers of 
labor services. 
7see Gaikwad et al. (1977) for a description of the IADP program. It 
is important to note in the context of the allocational efficiency hypothesis 
that the green revolution was not a :;one-shot;; inrrnd11rrinn nf ::i nPt.1 t-,:,rhnnlngy 
but rather represented the beginning of a continued flow of new grain 
varieties as well as new problems associated with disease resistance, fertilizer 
use, irrigation etc. It is the 'refueling' or continuous nature of the 
green revolution technologies that augment the returns to investment in 
education. 
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8 II · 11Consider the quasi-fixed effects model: 
where the a and 13 are coefficient vectors, the X are exogenous determinants 
of fertility, the~- are vectors of unobserved geographical characteristics 
l. 
and the Ei are random error terms, with cov (E1 
, E ) = 0. The bias in 131 ,2 
the estimated effect of the program on N, arises if cov (~1 
, ~ ) # 0
2 
(geographical characteristics persist over time) and both a1 
and e2 I 0. 
The method proposed in the text to eliminate the consequent covariance 
between IADP and the compound error term in the fertility equation is to 
find a set of exogenous instruments Z correlated with ~land to estimate 
the equation IADP = yZ + E3 , where E is orthogonal to the
 Zand contains 
3 
the original random error E 1 plus that part of the ~l term n
ot correlated 
with the Z, say El,
I 
If cov(E 1 , E ) and cov(E 11
, ~ ) = 0 then the regression
1 2 2 
N = 13 1X + 13 • (IADP - YA Z) + 13 ~ + E will provide. consistent estimates of 1 2 2 2 
the effects of IADP on N. For consistency, it thus is necessary that the Z 
reflect all of the variance in ~l that is correlated with ~ •2 
9Estimation of (17) using maximum-likelihood logit produced similar 
results except for a substantial decrease in the ratio of the LAND coefficient 
to its asymptotic standard error. The (unbiased) OLS estimates are used 
in t~e subsequent second-stage regressions to conform to the linearity 
assumptions required for proofs of consistency. 
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lOTo see the implications of the biological constraint on fertility 
due to the covariance between age and fecundity, consider the following simple 
non-stochastic identity f(a)=n(a)•(l - p), where f (a) is the birth rate of 
a woman in age interval a, n(a) is her potential fertility at age a and (1- p) 
is the degree to which fertility is controlled. If fertility control is 
a linear function of a set of X variables such that (1 - p) = BX, then the 
effect of a change in any X. on f is af = n(a)• B., which is a function of 
1 - 1 ax 
the age of the woman, since a2f(a) = anfa) ,B .• Division of actual births 
axi aa aa 
1 
by an approximation to potential fertility (natural fertility) results in 
the equation f(a)/N(a) = (1 - p) = BRAT, whose derivatives are independent 
of age. An alternative procedure, stratification of the sample into narrow 
age groups, would also reduce the problem but would result in a reduction 
in degrees of freedom, with consequent loss of estimation precision. For 
a more comp] ete discussion, see Hnul ier ;:mil Rnsenzwei g (1 978). 
11Natural fertility should not be confused with maximum fertility. 
Populations displaying natural fertility behavior are similar with respect 
to age-patterns of birth rates, but differ in fertility levels. The bias 
into account arises from the non-linear age pattern of fecundity, reflect­
ed in the n(x) schedule. 
12Note that the standardization procedure employed is superior to 
the use of dunnny variables as regressors depicting the age-composition of 
children since such variables will reflect, in part, family size. 
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13The extent to which actual. fertility is depressed below potential 
fertility may vary with age, as is true in the sample population studied. 
An age variable was thus included as a regressor in all the fertility 
equations. For women in farm households in the 4 5-year age groups 25-40, 
birth rates are .550, .407, .272 and .152 respectively while the birth 
ratios (BRAT) are .499, .390, .304, .236. 
14
rt will be recalled that school and factory presence were found to 
be positively associated. 
15 
we thus refrain from discussing the estimates associated with 
these variables in subsequent sections. The reader may supply his own 
interpretations. Itshould be noted, however, that exclusion of the 
parental schooling variables from the fertility and enrollment equations 
does not significantly alter the results obtained, although they do 
contribute significantly to the explanatory power of all equations. 
16rnclusion of the complete set of 1961 district characteristics used 
to estimate (17) in all the second-stage equations in addition to RES 
added significantly to explanatory power in all cases but did not alter 
the reported coefficients importantly. The parental.schooling variable 
coefficients tended to decrease in mangitude and statistical significance, 
however. 
17The relative magnitudes of the estimated income effects in the birth 
rate and enrollment equations are consistent with the hypothesis proposed 
by Becker and Tomes, given the relative importance of child endowments 
in child quality in a country such as India. However, it should be noted 
that the WLTHY coefficients reflect past savings decisions which may in part 
be correlated with preferences for numbers of children versus child quality. 
